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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FAA INDUSTRY TRAINING PROGRAM IN TECHNICALLY
ADVANCED AIRCRAFT (TAA): LESSONS LEARNED
Wayne A. Dornan, Wendy Beckman, Steve Gossett, Paul Craig, and Paul Mosey
Middle Tennessee State University, Department of Aerospace, 1500 Greenland Drive, PO Box 67
Murfreesboro, Tennessee, 37132
The proliferation of aircraft with extensive automation, collectively known as Technically Advanced Aircraft (TAA)
within the last 10 years in the General Aviation industry has led to a novel approach in flight training. The FAA
implemented the FAA-Industry Training Standards (FITS) program that emphasizes the importance of “real world”
training exercises in the form of scenario training. The FITS curriculum, which was first empirically tested by
Middle Tennessee State University (MTSU), was developed by Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and the
University of North Dakota through the FAA Air Transportation Center of Excellence for General Aviation. Over
the last four years, MTSU has evaluated the FITS training approach with students in a FAR 141 accepted, combined
Private Certificate/Instrument Rating syllabus in TAA. Our findings indicate the need for inclusion of several
maneuver-based lessons that facilitate the physical skills training required for some tasks (e.g. landing), early in the
FITS syllabus. The importance of consequences in the flight scenarios, the intensive flight instructor training
required prior to FITS implementation, and the incorporation of new elements into the ground school portion of the
curriculum are all “lessons learned” over the last several years of FITS implementation at MTSU.
final report concluded that among the contributing
factors was the pilot’s “lack of familiarity with the
make and model of the aircraft” [21]. In less than two
years following the Indiana crash, four other fatal
accidents involving the Malibu or Mirage occurred in
the United States [21]. Lack of knowledge
concerning aircraft systems and automation were
believed to be contributing factors in all of
the accidents [21].

Introduction
The proliferation of aircraft with extensive
automation, collectively known as “glass cockpit”
aircraft, within the last 10 years has led to increasing
concerns in the industry on how to best train flight
crews that have no flight experience in these aircraft
[1, 9, 12, 13]. Until very recently, issues with these
automated flight decks were seen as only relevant to
the air carrier segment of the aviation industry, where
they appear in all modern aircraft. As of late,
however, an increasing number of automated
cockpits are being seen in General Aviation (GA)
aircraft [2]. In the GA community, an automated
aircraft is generally comprised of an integrated
cockpit system consisting of a primary flight display,
a multifunction display including an instrumentcertified Global Positioning System (GPS) with
traffic and terrain graphics, and a fully integrated
autopilot. This type of aircraft is commonly known as
a Technically Advanced Aircraft (TAA) [11]. In a
TAA, there are typically two display (computer)
screens, the primary flight display (left display
screen) and the multi-function display.

In 1998, the FAA announced a “SAFER SKIES”
initiative to achieve significant reductions in the
number of GA fatal accidents by 2009. As part of this
initiative, the General Aviation Joint Steering
Committee (GAJSC) focused on the leading causes
of GA accidents. In order to assess what new safety
challenges occur with the advent of the TAA, the
GAJSC established a TAA study team to investigate
safety issues with TAA aircraft [7, 11]. Part of the
impetus for this was an early observed increase in
fatal accidents in the next generation TAA’s, the
Cirrus SR22 and SR20 [2, 21], which was
characteristic of the Malibu accidents in the early to
mid-90s [21]. A major recommendation in this report
was that the current training format in the industry
was insufficient to exploit the additional safety
features of TAA, and that there was a critical need to
develop a TAA training program in the GA
community [11]. As a result of these
recommendations, the FAA implemented the FAAIndustry Training Standards (FITS) program [10, 14].
This program emphasizes the importance of “real
world” training exercises in the form of scenario
training. This approach had proven successful in the
air carrier industry, but had not been attempted in the
GA community. This training places a major

Given the increasing availability of TAA in the GA
community, there is a need to develop a novel
approach to flight training to accommodate the new
technology. One major reason is that the history of
accident investigation indicates that when new
technologies are introduced, an increased rate of
aircraft accidents occur [11]. For example, an earlier
aircraft utilizing a new technology was the Piper
Malibu. On May 31, 1989, a Malibu had an “inflight” break up and crashed in Bristol, Indiana
killing the pilot and two passengers. The NTSB’s
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emphasis on: aeronautical decision making skills, risk
management, situational awareness, and single pilot
resource management using real-time flight scenarios
[3, 14]. Studies from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University (ERAU), the University of North Dakota
(UND), and Middle Tennessee State University
(MTSU) (see below) on the effectiveness of the FITS
curriculum have resulted in the FAA accepting the
FITS training approach as the industry standard for
all future flight training in General Aviation [14].

loaded.” This means that SAFER students were being
introduced to cross-country flight planning,
navigation, and instrument flight principles all before
the first solo. Our research up to that point indicated
that SAFER students pay a penalty for this expanded
curriculum at the very start of the course. Traditional
students are not exposed to cross country planning,
navigation, and instrument principles before solo, and
spend their time practicing takeoffs and landings in
anticipation of the first solo. This focused attention
on solo operations among traditional students
explained why they performed with fewer setbacks in
the pre-solo phase. However, it appeared that the
“penalty” the SAFER students paid in the early
lessons, was repaid later in the syllabus as the
number of setbacks during the entire training course
was less for these students compared to the
traditionally trained group. Based on the above, we
concluded that the evidence indicated that the largest
benefit of the SAFER project is toward the end of
training, when both groups are preparing for the
tests that cover both the Private Pilot and
Instrument Rating.

In 2004, MTSU received the first FAA acceptance to
train
students
for
a
combined
Private
Certificate/Instrument rating in TAA using the FITS
training program. This was a novel approach, as
traditionally, a student pilot is required to first
complete training for a Private Certificate, then
complete additional training for an Instrument rating.
At the time, the MTSU training fleet of glass-cockpit
Diamond DA-40s was the first such fleet of TAA
trainers outside the military.
The FITS curriculum was developed by ERAU and
UND through the FAA Air Transportation Center of
Excellence for General Aviation (CGAR). The FITS
curriculum was first tested at MTSU in 2004-05 in a
NASA funded project called “SAFER.” Over the last
two years, the MTSU SAFER research team has
published and presented the results of several studies
[4-8]. In the SAFER study, student pilots at MTSU
with fewer than 5 flight hours began their combined
Private/Instrument training in a Diamond DA-40 with
a Garmin G1000 under the FAA 8456 exemption that
allowed the SAFER students to take a single practical
test to gain both their Private and their Instrument
privileges [4, 5]. In that study, we examined
“setbacks”, which was operationally defined as: any
lesson that had to be repeated. Lessons from both a
traditional flight training syllabus and the FITS
accepted SAFER syllabus require a mastery of the
subject matter before a student moves on to the next
lesson. Therefore, a repeated lesson is indicative of
the student experiencing problems with that lesson.
These setbacks, over the course of training, in the
SAFER students were compared to a group of
“archival” students that received their flight training
using the traditional approach. In that study we
reported that the SAFER students experienced
significantly more setbacks in the “pre-solo” training
stages than the traditional students [4, 5]. In contrast,
the traditionally trained students experienced
significantly more setbacks over the rest of the
training compared to the SAFER group [4, 5]. Why
would this occur? One explanation is that the SAFER
project with the combined Private and Instrument
syllabus was, not surprisingly, very “front end

At this point, our research strongly suggested that
FITS trained pilots had fewer setbacks over their
entire VFR/IFR training than traditionally trained
pilots. Up to this time, however, all of the FITS
trained students utilized a TAA, while the traditional
syllabus students had completed all of their flight
training in a “round dial” aircraft. Therefore, it could
be argued that the overall decrease in setbacks
enjoyed by the FITS trained students were partly or
completely the result of the automation, e.g. the
TAA, and not the syllabus, effected the change. In
other words, it was possible that the FITS flighttraining syllabus had very little impact on decreasing
the number of setbacks. Consequently, in a
subsequent study we decided to empirically test for
this possibility by comparing a group of students who
had obtained their Instrument Rating in a TAA using
the traditional Jeppesen syllabus with a group of
FITS trained students in a TAA [6, 8]. In this study
we had three groups: 1) “Traditional Syllabus Glass”
group consisting of students who received their
instrument flight training in a TAA using a traditional
flight training syllabus, 2) a “FITS Glass” group
which consisted of the sixteen students from an
earlier study [4, 5] that were trained using the FITS
training program in a TAA, and 3), a “Traditional
Syllabus Round Archival” which consisted of the
training records of students who received their
instrument flight training in a round dial aircraft
using the traditional syllabus. These training records
served as archival data and were used to compare
setbacks over the course of the Instrument training
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with the other groups. In addition, participants in the
Traditional Syllabus Glass and the FITS Glass groups
were administered several questionnaires regarding
personal IFR visibility and cloud minimums which
were standardized in a previous study [6, 8].
Following the completion of this study we reported
that both the students using the traditional flight
training syllabus with either a TAA or “round dial”
aircraft, had a significantly greater number of
setbacks over their training compared to the SAFER
group [6, 8]. Based on these results we concluded
that it appears that it is the FITS methodology, and
not the aircraft (e.g., TAA) that made the difference.
We also reported that the FITS trained pilots
appeared to be more conservative when their personal
minimums were compared to Traditional Syllabus
Glass trained pilots [6, 8]. This was particularly
noteworthy as both groups of pilots who were trained
in a TAA, regardless of the training approach,
reported feeling very comfortable with the
automation in the aircraft, and also with shooting an
IFR approach to minimums. Regardless of their
comfort level, however, the increased visibility and
cloud minimums reported by the FITS trained pilots
suggested that although the FITS students are
comfortable with the automation, they would be less
likely to “launch” when visibility and clouds are low.

must be incorporated into this schema is the
consequence of the decision. If scenarios are
presented using the FITS training approach but the
scenario does not have any consequences associated
with the decision, then the scenario may generate
decisions that may not be realistic. The consequences
of the pilots’ decisions must be incorporated into
scenario based training as these “situational
variables” have a profound impact on the decision
making process [17, 20, 24]. At MTSU, we have
incorporated this type of “consequence based”
scenario into all of our FITS flight scenarios.
Many flight instructors and flight school managers
have had difficulties making the distinction between
scenario-based training and what they have always
done. The fact is that good flight instructors have
always incorporated real-world situations into their
flight training. A common practice is for a flight
instructor to introduce a “what if” into the flight
lesson. They will ask the student, “what if the
weather started getting bad at our planned
destination?” The student might respond by saying
that they would divert to a different destination and
the instructor would allow the student to do just that.
In fact, the objective of the lesson may have been
entirely about forcing the student to adjust the flight’s
navigation while in flight. The stated destination of
the flight was never the true destination at all. We
call this situation an “inside the flight” scenario. The
difference between this common approach to flight
training and the FITS concept of scenario training is
the lack of consequences. When the student elects to
divert to a new destination “inside the flight” the
objective is simply the diversion and there is no
consequence for failing to arrive at the original
destination. But what if before the flight began, the
student was presented with a reason for the flight to
be conducted in the first place – a situation “outside
the flight.” What if the reason for the flight was to
deliver a human transplant organ to the destination
airport? A diversion from the original plan in this
case comes with serious consequences – the possible
loss of a human life. If the pilot is making a no
consequences diversion decision just to meet the
requirements of a lesson, the decision is easy and no
real-world preparation is gained. If the pilot is
making a decision and the consequences mean life or
death, the decision is much harder and much
more real.

Lessons Learned
The Importance of a “Consequence” in ScenarioBased Training. Improving pilot decision making
skills and judgment has long been a priority in GA.
Indeed, on December 12th, 1991, the FAA published
the Advisory Circular, AC-60-22, which defined
aeronautical decision making (ADM) as: “a
systematic approach to the mental processes used by
aircraft pilots to consistently determine the best
course of action in response to a given set of
circumstances” [16]. Given the range of personality
differences that are inherent among pilots and the
recognition that pilots often make wrong decisions, a
plethora of research has been conducted on pilot
decision making abilities in an attempt to improve
pilot judgment. The inherent logic of the FITS
training approach is that aeronautical decisionmaking skills are improved by presenting pilot
trainees with ambiguous situations in training that
requires the pilot to use a more complex cognitive
decision structure than he/she would normally use in
the more traditional training approach. The logic is as
follows: when presented with a real-time scenario,
the pilot must generate a variety of possible
decisions, assess their possible outcomes, and choose
a decision regarding the most plausible course of
action [15, 18, 19, 22, 23]. One key ingredient that

Implementation Issues. Over the last four years,
MTSU in collaboration with our colleagues at ERAU
and UND, has been evaluating the FITS training
approach. In fact, in the Spring 2007 semester MTSU
adopted the FITS combined Private/Instrument
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training as the Professional Pilot program standard,
and this was not a small step. Making the change
from the traditional curriculum to the FITS program
required a coordinated effort among researchers,
curriculum writers, flight school managers, flight
instructors and students. First, we completed a
revision to the original Private/Instrument syllabus.
The primary revision was to reduce the steep initial
learning curve that confronted the SAFER students.
As stated previously, the SAFER students suffered
more setbacks in their training before the first solo
than did traditional students. One of the lessons
learned from SAFER was that despite the scenario
based approach, there are still some skills that require
repetition to master, and landing an airplane is one of
those skills. The original syllabus had ten “out-andback” scenarios as its first ten lessons, followed by a
first solo flight. It was assumed that the twenty
landings accomplished at the end of each leg of the
first ten lessons would accumulate enough landing
skill to allow a student to fly solo by that point. This
assumption did not prove correct. The students were
not ready to solo and required repeated lessons
(setbacks) to achieve solo skill level. To help remedy
this problem, we applied this lesson learned into the
syllabus revision to allow for several maneuverbased, landing repetition lessons.

flight school does not have the complete solution to
this issue, but has gone to scheduling a student/
instructor pair in a four-hour time block. This gives
the instructor the freedom to allow the scenario to
progress to its logical conclusion instead of being
scripted to fit the flight school’s strict schedule.
Learner center grading is also a challenge to
traditional schedules. At the conclusion of a scenario
lesson, the student and instructor separate and
complete an evaluation sheet independent of each
other. After completing the evaluation sheet, the two
come back together and compare evaluations. Often
the student and instructor have assigned the same
grade on a particular task, but just as often there are
disagreements. The evaluation disagreements will
spark discussions that lead the student to explore
different options, decisions, and outcomes to the
scenario. This has proven to be extremely valuable to
the student, but this process is time consuming and
must be planned for in scheduling.
Another vital lesson learned deals with the flight
instructors themselves. The flight instructors used in
the first SAFER project were selected for their openmindedness in addition to excellent instructing skills.
That original group participated in all the training
sessions that were available at the time and worked
with a small number of students. Having the total
population of flight students use scenario-based
training means the total population of flight
instructors must be trained in the use of this
technique. The current staff of instructors were
already “in the pipeline” when scenario-based
training was adopted and most were trained using
traditional methods. We have learned that you must
start early with staff development and training
because this transition requires the instructors to
change long-held attitudes and beliefs. For example,
one of the most frequent objections voiced by flight
instructors during initial FITS training was in
response to the third lesson in the syllabus (the first
flight in an aircraft), which calls for a “cross country”
flight. Because of their own experiences in flight
training, flight instructors envisioned several tedious
hours teaching their students conventional cross
country flight planning before the student ever saw
an airplane. However, the real intent of this lesson is
simply to introduce the student to a very normal, real
world scenario of departing one airport, flying to
another, and landing. The introduction of a sectional
chart to the student, and the use of pilotage to
navigate to a nearby airport, are sufficient for a
lesson at this level, and should not be overwhelming
to the student. In a somewhat similar instance, the
introduction of VOR approach procedures on lesson

The scenario based learning concepts and procedures
were a significant challenge to the everyday
operation of a flight school. The original SAFER
students trained in all TAA airplanes, but that is not
possible with all students participating. When
accommodating a larger population of students, all
the airplanes of the flight program, both round dial
and TAA, are needed so decisions had to be made
about which lessons within the syllabus required a
TAA, which required round dials, and which could
use either.
The nature of scenario-based training is that the
instructor really does not know what decisions the
student will make along the way and therefore, they
really do not know what the lesson outcome will be.
This being the case, the instructor does not know
when the scenario will end – so how does one
schedule for that? Traditionally, flight schools
schedule the instructor, student, and airplane together
in set time blocks. Two hours is common. But
scenarios must be flexible and allow for different inflight decisions to take place. If the student in the
scenario elects to divert from the original plan, the
lesson could take less or more time than predicted.
The fact that airplanes must operate on a schedule,
while scenarios do not operate with any predictable
schedule, presents a large challenge. The MTSU
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seven caused initial consternation among flight
instructors. But once it was understood that an
instructor-assisted conduct of a “visual” VOR
approach (where the student could look out of the
cockpit and physically see what the aircraft’s VOR
indications meant) was a natural outgrowth of a
lesson on VOR orientation and navigation, instructor
concerns were alleviated.

systems (VASI, PAPI) to go ahead and explain in
general terms what an ILS approach is. Then later in
the course, when VOR navigation is covered, ILS
navigation can also be discussed. This manner of
introducing important topics at least provides
students with a rough framework for what they are
beginning to experience in flight training.
The use of the glass Diamond DA-40s from the
beginning stages of training requires students to
become familiar with the Garmin G1000 system very
early in training. To accommodate this, the Private
ground school now has an added component, which
requires students to complete a self-paced Garmin
G1000 tutorial. Students complete quizzes at the end
of each training module and discussions of the
appropriate use of the technology occur throughout
the class.

During instructor training, it also became clear that
additional instructor guidance regarding the scenarios
to be flown would be required. In the original
SAFER project, there was not a separate “instructor
guide”. However, since many newly-minted flight
instructors have very limited exposure to “real world”
scenarios themselves, more comprehensive notes
were needed to insure that instructors were able to
conduct the scenarios as envisioned by the
curriculum authors. In addition, a detailed discussion
of each lesson’s scenario during flight instructor
meetings, including appropriate and inappropriate
decision-making given the circumstances presented,
is a key component of successful implementation.
Since low flight time, conventionally trained
instructors have not necessarily experienced many
scenarios themselves, it is obviously critical that they
understand and can apply appropriate decisionmaking strategies before expecting their students to
do the same.

Additionally, efforts have been made to incorporate
scenarios that require student decision-making into
the ground school classes, to better prepare students
for what they will experience in flight. As with flight
training, good ground instructors have long
incorporated “real life problems” in ground training.
Unfortunately, it is easy to fall into the trap of having
so much material to cover that time is not taken to
discuss the “what ifs”. But, with awareness, this
problem can be alleviated. For example, instead of
just working through the specifics of aircraft
electrical systems in class, providing a problem-based
case study for students to reflect on results in much
more growth in student decision-making capability.
Regarding electrical systems, students can be given a
scenario such as the following: “You are on a night
VFR cross country, 50 miles from your destination
airport, and experience an alternator failure. What are
the ramifications of this failure, and what actions will
you take to handle the situation?” By allowing
students to work on this type problem as a homework
assignment and then discussing the case in class,
students are able to grapple with applying good
decision-making skills at a very early point in
their training.
Summary

Finally, while simply an administrative concern, it
proved to be hard for flight instructors to manage the
long task performance lists that are a part of every
FITS curriculum lesson. Trying to refer to a
sometimes lengthy task list in a cramped cockpit was
difficult. To address this issue, a checklist style list of
all the tasks required at any point in the curriculum
was developed, which fits on the front and back of
one 8.5x11 inch sheet of paper. For each lesson, the
appropriate tasks to be accomplished on that lesson
are printed in bold, for easy reference by the flight
instructor. Now, it is a simple matter for the
instructor to utilize the task checklist for a particular
flight lesson, instead of having to refer to the actual
curriculum while in the aircraft.
The implementation of FITS flight training has also
necessitated changes in the conduct of ground
training. While the ground school classes have
remained roughly segregated into the conventional
“Private” and “Instrument” components, there is a
need to expose students to instrument concepts at a
very early stage. While there is not time to fully
explain ILS approaches, for example, in the first few
weeks of a Private ground school, it is not too
difficult, while discussing visual approach guidance

This successful implementation of a FITS training
syllabus does not happen over night. The lessons
learned to this point have improved the product used
today, but it is still an ongoing process. The faculty
and staff at MTSU are discovering better ways to
deliver this teaching philosophy everyday.
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